| Thursday, December 18, 1997 |
NWPPC Conference Room,
Portland, Oregon
|
Proponents of different approaches to transition costs regaled the Northwest Energy Review Transition Board with their opinions. All members of the board were present. The audience was about 50.
Next Meeting: January 13 in Seattle.
HEADLINES_____________________________________________________________
Transmission, Subscription, and Three Sovereigns
Updates
People Come From Afar Bearing Transition Cost Proposals:
-
Public Power’s Five Principles
Bumpers/Gorton "Placeholder"
NWEC: A Pair of Pachyderms
IOUs: A "Clean Handoff" to FERC
Stay Tuned for Inter-Tribe
The "Cost or Market Choice" Proposal
Is There An Aspirin in the House?
ORDER OF
BUSINESS_______________________________________________________________
Transmission, Subscription, and Three Sovereigns
Updates
Consultant Al Wright reported that the Transmission Work Group had not done any
work on transmission in October or November and that a December 19 meeting had
been canceled. The cancellation was a scheduling matter, he said. Wright
indicated that a workshop on transmission will be held early next year and that
the work group would "carry on with FERC-equivalency activities then."
The Subscription Work Group is "continuing to make progress," Wright reported. The "benchmark" date is July 1998, he said. By then, the group hopes to have identified products and services, laid out an implementation mechanism, and determined the pricing of products and services, Wright stated. Bilateral contract negotiations would then begin, he noted.
In response to a question about the December 17 meeting of the three sovereigns, Roy Hemmingway reported that quite a bit of progress had been made on the draft agreement being prepared by the three sovereigns’ staff. Comments made at the meeting will be incorporated into a new version of the document, which the four governors will consider at a meeting in mid-January, he stated. After that, the draft will be sent out for public comment, Hemmingway said. In February or March, the document should be in final form, he added.
The discussion at the meeting, according to Hemmingway, dealt with how broad the scope of the three sovereigns process should be. The decision was that it should be narrow, focused on the fisheries on the Columbia River without "bringing in everything else," he said. The question is how to do that, and that’s what the draft document will reflect, Hemmingway stated. The document is a draft Memorandum of Agreement among 13 tribes, "relevant federal agencies," and four states, he continued. The draft sets up a process where issues affecting the Columbia River can be discussed in order to get all the sovereigns to make a unified decision "so that we don’t have conflicting plans" -- that’s the goal, Hemmingway said.
People Come From Afar Bearing Transition Cost Proposals
Staffer Dick Watson explained that a matrix, which attempts to capture key features of the various transition cost proposals, had been prepared. The matrix reflects proposals from public power, the Gorton/Bumpers legislation, the Northwest Energy Coalition, the IOUs, the Smith/DeFazio legislation, Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission staff, industrial customers, and a possible default scenario involving a transmission surcharge, he said. Watson asked the proponents of the proposals to describe their ideas.
Public Power’s Five Principles
Maureen Carr of the Public Power Council (PPC) said that public power’s transition cost proposal is one piece of an integrated package, which also addresses FERC regulation of BPA’s transmission. There are five principles that govern public power’s approach to transition cost recovery, she explained:
- BPA would be prohibited from including generation costs in transmission rates, except as provided in the transition cost recovery mechanism.
- This transition cost recovery mechanism would be the only transition cost recovery mechanism applied to BPA.
- BPA would be prohibited from making claims (contractual, statutory, or other) for the collection of transition costs from individual customers or customer classes other than through the transition cost recovery mechanism.
- BPA’s existing priority of payments from the BPA fund and BPA’s current authority to defer payments to the Treasury would be maintained.
- To ensure the most broad-based collection of transition costs, the transition cost recovery mechanism would include a transition charge that applies to all users of the federal transmission system.
Once triggered, the transition cost charge would be applied to all users of the federal transmission system on a uniform basis, including purchasers of bundled, delivered federal power, Carr said. BPA would conduct a public process in the fourth quarter of any fiscal year in which it expects to defer a Treasury payment, she explained. BPA’s books would be opened for its power and transmission customers to look at, and disputes about the size of the shortfall, the calculation of customer liability for it, and the size of the transition cost charge could be appealed to FERC, Carr stated. BPA would treat amounts surcharged to transmission to cover power business line deferrals as loans from transmission to power, in the same fashion as BPA currently treats deferrals, and nothing in the crediting mechanism would be construed to change BPA’s existing priority of payments or authority to defer Treasury payments, she said.
Staffer Ken Corum pointed out that the transition cost proposal in the legislation authored by Senators Dale Bumpers and Slade Gorton is general. In a nutshell, he said, it turns the decision over to FERC once BPA initiates the process. BPA would indicate that it has a transition cost problem and then turn the matter over to FERC to decide, Corum said.
There’s an important nuance missing from the matrix, commented consultant Jim Litchfield. The legislation permits BPA, if it deems that its WPPSS debt is in jeopardy, "to do virtually anything it wants," he said. It opens up another process that is "not FERC-oriented," where BPA can make decisions, Litchfield stated. I’ve heard the Bumpers/Gorton proposal characterized as a "placeholder" by Senate staff, who are aware that it will get a lot more work, said Wright.
The matrix also included a column for legislation introduced by Representatives Bob Smith and Peter DeFazio, and a column called "Possible Default: BPA Transmission," which described a charge on federal transmission to be used as a transition cost recovery mechanism. You’ve heard about this; we don’t need to explain it, said Wright.
Angus Duncan of the Columbia/Pacific Institute for Energy and the Environment described the Northwest Energy Coalition’s (NWEC) proposal, noting that it had been presented to the Transition Board a few months ago. He suggested thinking of the proposal as "a little elephant in the living room" and "a big elephant in the living room."
The "little elephant" is the set of problems BPA could have due to market fluctuations or water variations, where BPA costs and the market "are dancing back and forth," Duncan said. Relatively small shortfalls should be dealt with by a stranded cost recovery mechanism triggered by a drop in reserves of a certain level, he explained. The "big elephant" refers to a situation where, for example, the region decides to make a major reconfiguration in the hydro system and substantially increase the amount of money being spent on fish, according to Duncan. If you are going to do that, you can forecast the costs and consequences and figure out what costs will be incurred when, he said. Since you can foresee them, you wouldn’t wait for a default, Duncan stated.
The region should step up to this, Duncan continued. We propose a "prospective trigger" for stranded cost recovery, calculated on the probability of BPA Treasury repayment dropping below a specified level, he stated. You can anticipate a capital cost bow wave and adjust revenue collection to deal with it, Duncan said. We know customers need a higher degree of predictability about what future costs will be, he stated. We are not proposing a limit on the amount of money to be spent on fish -- Congress will determine that, said Duncan. But we do propose a limit on how much money could be passed on to customers as a stranded cost in any given year, he stated. We could negotiate a customer cost cap and negotiate with Treasury to finance costs in excess of the cap, Duncan said.
Unless we do something that deals with both of these two elephants, BPA and the Administration will, properly, reserve the right to shift costs from the power business line to the transmission business line, Duncan stated. The cost at issue is bigger than the $50 million public power has put on the table, he continued. The "default" proposal in the matrix, with a $200 million estimate, is a "bad alternative," but it’s better than none, and the Administration will reserve it until it gets something to deal with its risks in other ways, Duncan said.
We structured the "big elephant" proposal so that BPA can’t use it to "make itself whole," but BPA can use it to get back to solvency, he continued. The "prospective" stranded cost recovery would allow BPA to return its Treasury payment probability to "some reasonable level," but not to a level, such as 95 or 100 percent, that takes all the pressure for cost control off BPA, Duncan said. BPA would have to continue to manage its costs to pull itself back into good shape and increase the probability of repayment, he said.
The mechanism could be a wires charge or a meters charge keyed to some calculation of historic use of the system, Duncan stated. This would assure that all parties who have gotten historic benefits, and also participated in postponing some costs into the future, would pay some reasonably equitable share of the region’s costs, he explained. Is there a proportion you have in mind for the wires charge? asked John Etchart. We left a proportion out, said Duncan. I’d like to do it all with a meters charge, but we recognize there may have to be a combination, he added.
What’s the distinction between the wires charge and the meters charge? asked DSI attorney Paul Murphy. The wires charge is a proposal to use the transmission system, and the meters charge is a proposal to use historic end-use load, replied Duncan. Is federal or state legislation needed for a meters charge? asked Mike Kreidler. Federal legislation would be needed, responded Duncan. Would a meters charge take self-generation into account? asked Hemmingway. There would have to be some compromises, replied Steve Weiss of the NWEC. I see the historic charge looking more like what the state public utility commissions (PUCs) are doing with respect to stranded costs, he added. Some of this may have to be delegated to the PUCs, Duncan said.
What if these costs kick in in the year 2001 and a company has gone out of business? asked Joe Piedmont of the Gallatin Group. It’s clear it will be hard to achieve perfect equity -- the best that can be achieved is a kind of rough equity, replied Duncan. You could assign a charge to a utility, and the utility would average it by charging everyone who moves in and out of its service territory, said Weiss. It can be done -- states do it all the time, he added.
What’s the starting premise -- is it BPA selling at market? asked Litchfield. BPA will be selling at cost or market through the subscription process, replied Duncan. The trigger for the "small elephant" could be a new cost factor, he said. What’s the limit? asked Litchfield. We’ve "thrown around" the number of 2 mills on power, replied Weiss. It could be a "peanut butter" approach applied to "all who touch the transmission system," or it could be applied to historic users, based on the kilowatt-hours historically consumed, he stated. There has to be a limit so customers will know what the cap on stranded costs will be, Weiss said. This is separate from arrangements customers will make with BPA in contracts, noted Duncan. A cap could be that a customer wouldn’t see more than 2 mills based on its historic load in a year, and the rest would be taken care of by Treasury, he said.
Who would decide on the historic period? asked consultant Linc Wolverton. It would have to be in the legislation, Duncan answered. It would be sometime prior to the hydrothermal program, he added. It seems like the trigger based on reserves and the prospective recovery trigger would both trigger all the time, observed Terry Mundorf of the Western Public Agencies Group. Are they designed not to? he asked. I can see where one would, but the other wouldn’t, said Duncan. But there’s nothing to prohibit it? asked Mundorf. I’ll think more about that, said Duncan.
How does the cap apply to the historic period? asked Murphy. We could design a cap on customer liability in any given year, responded Duncan. I thought the limit was 2 mills, said Mundorf. It would be only in the case if someone went to self-generation, said Duncan. You couldn’t step away from this by terminating your relationship with BPA, he added. What if you have a company like Martin-Marietta? asked Murphy. If a plant in The Dalles shut down, but another entrepreneur bought it and took load from a supplier in the region, you would be able to apply the stranded cost mechanism to that load, said Duncan. So you’re talking about a consumption fee, independent of transmission, based on the use of electricity in the Northwest? asked Murphy. The historic period would be a rough calculation of responsibility, and stranded costs may vary from customer to customer, replied Duncan. We’ve talked about the possibility of some customers with Endangered Species Act responsibilities being granted offsets in their costs, as a way to manage to as equitable an assessment as we can get, he added.
IOUs: A "Clean Handoff" to FERC
Litchfield presented an IOU proposal which assumes, he said, that as a region, we don’t have the tools to negotiate stranded costs ourselves and that we’ll have to appeal to someone else. It is based on the idea it is reasonable to go to an independent, outside party who can determine responsibility, mitigation, and how costs would be recovered, he said. Our proposal acknowledges that FERC is set up to do this and is doing it, according to Litchfield. FERC Order 888 doesn’t apply to BPA very well, but nevertheless, we shouldn’t assume that FERC is not up to this task, he stated. We think FERC ought to deal with BPA in a way that is consistent with how it deals with everyone else, avoiding the risk of "putting a spotlight on BPA," Litchfield said. We should turn the stranded cost issue over to FERC and let them deal with it, he concluded.
Would your proposal require some special legislative direction to FERC? asked Wright. Yes, we have proposed language, said Litchfield, adding, there are lots of ways to do this and some good ideas have been put forward. This requires "a clean handoff" to FERC, he said.
Do you think FERC should decide on this matter before customers sign contracts? asked Mundorf. It probably needs to be done in advance to have a successful subscription process, replied Litchfield. Does your proposal focus on historical customers, rather than a "peanut butter" approach spread across the region? asked Weiss. Yes, FERC hasn’t supported a peanut-butter approach on transmission because it can cause market distortions, said Litchfield. We don’t know what FERC would do with the historic period, he stated. FERC would grill BPA on its management of costs and on whether it has been mitigating appropriately, Litchfield said. FERC would look at everything, and it might look at the facts and say that BPA doesn’t have a stranded cost problem, he stated.
Suppose we defer to FERC as you recommend, Duncan said, but we give FERC legislative directions along the lines set out in our proposal. What directions would we give FERC? he asked. We should give FERC broad guidance, said Litchfield. FERC has Federal Power Act standards, and FERC has "taken that truck and driven it all over the country," he added. In what way do you see our system as unique and requiring a different template than FERC has applied to the rest of the country? asked Duncan. The Northwest Power Act framed the contracts we operate under now, said Litchfield. When that was written, no one could have predicted that wholesale market costs would go below BPA, he continued. FERC will have to look at the Act and the other statutes that apply and evaluate whether BPA has stranded costs, who’s responsible, and how to recover them, Litchfield said.
Are there circumstances that pertain to BPA that would lead you to give special directives to FERC to treat BPA differently? asked Duncan. No, BPA’s "fact patterns" are so unique that FERC would take that into account, Litchfield responded. FERC won’t need much; it can use Federal Power Act standards -- it could be "a pretty small punt of the ball" to them, he stated. FERC would at least do something consistent with the rest of the country, Litchfield said. If the Northwest stands out, we set ourselves up for big problems back East, he cautioned.
Which contracts would you recommend FERC look at in making its determination? asked Shelly Richardson, attorney for the PPC. All contracts, replied Litchfield. That’s why I think we should not put all our eggs in the historical basket, but should spread the costs over all, commented Weiss.
Ken Johnston of the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission (Inter-Tribe) said the Inter-Tribe proposal on the matrix was a staff proposal. He said he was not authorized to present it at this time and that other Inter-Tribe staff were not available. The tribes are interested in the question of stranded costs, as well as in all deregulation questions, Johnston pointed out.
Inter-Tribe would like to meet with the Transition Board to talk about this issue and other issues that are tangentially related to it, he stated. Other tribes are interested too, said Johnston. He circulated copies of comments the Spokane Tribes made on the cost recovery draft issues paper prepared by three sovereigns’ staff.
The "Cost or Market Choice" Proposal
Attorney Melinda Horgan presented a proposal, which she said has the support of the IOUs and DSIs, called the "cost or market choice" proposal. Independent studies show that the federal power system has significant net present value, and that while in the first few years after BPA’s power sales contracts expire, BPA power costs may be above market, in the longer term, BPA’s power is forecast to be well below market, she said. Rather than stranded costs, BPA, like any utility, faces the possibility that annual costs may differ from annual revenues, hence it has a cash management problem, stated Horgan.
We believe that competitive pressures have already caused BPA to reduce its costs and rates, but its costs are still higher than they need to be, she continued. BPA shouldn’t be permitted to use its transmission monopoly to shield itself from the need to more efficiently manage its power business, according to Horgan. BPA should be required to manage both its transmission and power businesses consistent with national energy policy, which forbids the use of transmission to give special advantage to the transmission owner’s power marketing, she stated.
Fundamental to this proposal is that the Northwest should align the risks and benefits of access to the federal system through the subscription process, Horgan said. Let each customer choose whether to commit to a cost-based power purchase arrangement with BPA or whether to rely on the market, she recommended. Allowing customers to exercise this choice doesn’t burden Treasury because of the positive net value of the federal system, Horgan said. Any power not subscribed in the region should be sold at market prices, she stated. BPA should be subject to cost-of-service practices and to FERC regulatory oversight that, among other things, prevents cost shifting, Horgan said. Our proposal allows, as part of BPA’s cash management tools, limited interfunctional loans, when necessary, in the unlikely event BPA would otherwise experience a default on its third-party debt, she explained. We’ll be working more on this proposal and will add more information to our column on the matrix, Horgan stated.
Murphy said the DSIs agree customers should be able to choose cost-based BPA power or to rely on the market. The stranded cost discussion is premature, he said. There’s a need to solve the conflict of interest that BPA’s power and transmission business lines have, and to have BPA’s transmission facilities regulated like a monopoly is regulated, Murphy stated.
Are you saying the Treasury would act like a stockholder? asked Hemmingway. That’s right, replied Horgan. The idea is to take the limits off BPA and let BPA maximize the value of its power to get long-term benefits, said Litchfield. How does this proposal work with the legislative proposal the IOUs submitted? asked Richardson. The IOU legislation deals with FERC-equivalency regulation of BPA, said Litchfield. This deals with the subscription process, he stated. There have been studies that say the federal system has value, Litchfield continued. If the region doesn’t accept that, this says the federal government can go to the market to get benefit from the system, he added.
Which of the DSIs support this? asked Richardson. It’s our view BPA does not have a stranded cost problem, and several studies support this, replied Murphy. If it were time to look at stranded costs, we would expect to scrutinize the value of the system, look at all the liabilities and how to enhance assets, and only after that, could stranded costs be identified, he said. According to Murphy, DSIs with "no objection to this document" include Intalco, Columbia Falls, Kaiser, Reynolds, Northwest Aluminum, and Goldendale.
Would the customer’s selection of cost or market be a one-time selection? asked Richardson. Yes, but a customer could take a portion of its load at market and a portion of its load at cost, replied Wolverton. If a customer chooses not to buy cost-based power, and then five years later, wanted to buy, could it? asked Richardson. If it hadn’t elected to buy cost-based power, then it would have to buy on a negotiated basis, Wolverton said. Which large publics have you talked with about this proposal? asked Public Generating Pool attorney Ray Kindley. We have talked with some and received some positive encouragement, but I’m not comfortable with saying who, replied Horgan.
Are you saying any customer could purchase from BPA? asked Carr. We are not proposing to open up retail wheeling or customer choice with this language, responded Horgan. Does it mean BPA can sell anywhere to anyone to maximize value? asked Carr. It is not the intention to let BPA market at retail, replied Litchfield.
We are proposing that a customer makes a choice to buy cost-based power or takes its chances on the market, said Murphy. We are making no recommendations or proposals about how BPA does its long-term marketing, he stated.
Would there be a limit on the amount of stranded cost charges under this proposal? asked Kreidler. We don’t envision the need for FERC or anyone else to identify stranded costs because we won’t get to that point, replied Horgan. But if there’s a determination otherwise -- you’re not specifying any limits? asked Kreidler. We think subscription will work and should be given the chance to do so, said Horgan.
If the "big elephant" system configuration occurs after all customers have chosen, does your proposal anticipate that if the market won’t support those costs, they would go to Treasury? asked Mundorf. Yes, Wolverton replied. Would customers who signed up for cost-based power pay for part of the costs of system reconfiguration? asked Mundorf. They would pay whatever they agreed to in their subscriptions, Wolverton answered. The Treasury would be the shareholder only for the unsubscribed portion, clarified Wright. We don’t know what the subscription contracts will look like, stated Wolverton. I don’t think it’s likely Congress will decide to tear out the dams, leaving customers to pay all the costs and also not get the power, said Murphy.
A Stab At Putting It All Together
Wright suggested the group try to determine "where the boundaries are" with respect to elements of the different proposals. He started with "who decides?" It appears that this has to be an outside party, not BPA’s decision, Wright said. The majority of the proposals seem to think FERC is the judicial party to which appeals should be taken, he stated. We didn’t have FERC as the decisionmaker, said Carr.
Wright went to another item, "ongoing cost control mechanism." You all think there should be one, he said. Our view is that there are no stranded costs, said Murphy. There’s never been an effort to quantify this "problem," he stated.
It would be better to try to identify differences, not commonalities, Murphy suggested. Trying to do this piece by piece won’t work, said Weiss. Some positions are inflexible, and we should "write that down and go on," he stated. A position that says "there is no problem ever" doesn’t lend itself to compromise, Weiss pointed out. We need to work with other parties’ positions where we can and get to the bargaining, he said.
I don’t think this discussion is productive if the test is consensus, said Duncan. It can only be productive if the test is "near consensus," he stated. Then those people taking positions outside the boundaries will decide to move to the center or stand in peril of being left out there by themselves, Duncan said. We have to have an idea of where people stand, and this exercise is helpful, observed Kreidler.
Should FERC be the entity if we have to have a "court of last resort"? asked Wright. The IOUs have the discussion start at FERC, and the publics’ proposal gets to FERC at the end, said Mundorf. There’s a big issue as to whether it goes to FERC under prevailing stranded cost rules or special directions specific to the Northwest, said Duncan. The Inter-Tribe proposal doesn’t have FERC, it has the federal, state, and tribal governments in coordination with the three sovereigns process, said Johnston.
Wright noted there is some "expectation of repayment" in most of the proposals. Don’t use loans, said Mundorf. We didn’t propose any surcharge, and we aren’t talking about wires fees being loans, stated Murphy.
Wright brought up "triggering mechanism." Some approaches specify a threshold for reserves, and others allow deferral to occur, he said. Is the concern about the political consequences of deferral? Wright asked. Yes, it’s a watershed issue, replied Mundorf. What about limits of recovery? asked Wright, noting that the proposals set different amounts as limits. Litchfield said FERC doesn’t look at future costs. The issue is "the big, scary fish thing" whenever it shows up, and that’s not a FERC issue, he said.
Is it reasonable to size the problem as: zero, a small problem, or a big problem? asked Wright. There’s a big disagreement over whether stranded costs have anything to do with future federal decisions about dams, stated Murphy. It’s not an argument about sizing; the question is, what is it we are trying to apprehend with this solution? said Mundorf. Are we trying to deal with the cost of transitioning or something else? he asked.
Is there any point in bifurcating this in terms of time or events? asked Watson. There are four issues, and they are not defined, Murphy said: what to do about BPA’s past commitments; what to do about the fact BPA continues to spend money on "not-now commitments"; what if markets turn out not to be what is expected; and what if Congress does something in the future about a major dam reconfiguration that reduces system output and costs a lot of money.
That last item isn’t separate, said Weiss. It’s the same as what was done in the past, he continued. We built a nuclear plant, and we have to pay decommissioning for it; we built dams and they hurt fish, Weiss stated. We do need to define the issue, he agreed. So the definitional part is more important than sizing? asked Wright. Yes, was the response.
Wright moved on to "who pays, and what’s the recovery mechanism?" Almost all the proposals talk about transmission, he noted. There are different approaches -- some are targeted versus those that would have everyone pay, Wright said. The determination of how to collect, just as the determination of whether there are stranded costs, should be "fact-intense," stated Murphy. We are not supporting stranded costs, but if you go down that path, you need to quantify the costs, look at the system’s assets, and then conclude if there are stranded costs, he continued. You need a "fact-intensive" view of the relationships customers have had with the system over time, Murphy said. We talk about peanut butter as the "indiscriminate nuclear weapon," but you’ll always target somebody, said Litchfield. The question is how to determine what’s fair and equitable, he stated.
Is There An Aspirin in the House?
"Who’s got some Tylenol?" quipped Etchart at the end of the discussion. Do we have a work plan that we just talked through? he asked. We can try to write up what we just talked about and send it out as a draft, suggested Wright. I sense more movement than there was at the last meeting on this subject, said Mundorf. I suggest we have another get-together early in January so we don’t have to revisit all these discussions later, he added.
The Transition Board decided to take up transition costs again at its January 13 meeting at the SeaTac airport. In between now and then, we could have some staff-facilitated sessions and some "staff shuttle diplomacy," suggested Etchart. I encourage the board to work with us in the manner you did today, said Richardson. Do other parties think this is right approach? asked Etchart. The response was positive.
What’s the "maturity level" of the quantification of transition costs that staff is working on? asked Etchart. Some work is done now, and we’ll have more in February, said Watson. So we can argue on principle until then, said Duncan.
I have grave doubts about whether you can sell the concept of not having a specific mechanism for stranded costs to Congress, observed Kreidler. I have real difficulty believing that we’ll convince Congress and the Administration that we’re stepping up to this, he stated.
I’d like to express appreciation to the PPC for bringing public power together on a proposal, stated Maddock. Our effort was broader than the PPC -- every part of public power has participated in developing this proposal, said Carr.
I’m glad Terry said we are making progress -- I hadn’t noticed, Maddock said. The Transition Board is under pressure to bring this to some conclusion, and I’d like to share that pressure with you, he stated. If we have a contingency plan in place and never need it, that will be great, Maddock continued. But we need to move this forward, he said.
There’s no position in Northwest legislation that would more surely engender opposition than not having a stranded cost mechanism, said Hemmingway. People in Washington, D.C. have been very clear that it is their number one priority, he stated. It will either be written there or here, and we will be better off if it is written here, Hemmingway said.
Transition Board Members: John Etchart, Montana Governor’s Representative; Roy Hemmingway, Oregon Governor’s Representative; Mike Kreidler, Washington Governor’s Representative; Todd Maddock, Idaho Governor’s Representative. This meeting report is a service provided by the Northwest Power Planning Council, with financial assistance contributed by the Pacific Northwest Utilities Conference Committee (PNUCC).